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Figure  shows how we tend to define the differences between security, safety, defense and 
protection. In engineering terms, security is a sufficiency definition: you have a sufficient 
supply. Safety is a reliability definition: the system reliably prevents unintended failures. 
Defense is a resiliency concept: how resilient the system is to intentional or catastrophic 
perturbations. Then protection is the continuum of safety and defense. Almost everything 
that impacts food safety also impacts food defense, and the reverse is also true. 
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Figure . Food continuum paradigm.
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I will discuss emerging intentional threats and examine technology needs in two ar-
eas: the food-system drivers that generate concerns for intentional contamination; and 
the intentional contamination drivers. We will deal with each of the items in Figure , 
because aspects inherent in our food system make intentional contamination a concern 
and there are behaviors of individuals and groups that also make intentional contamina-
tion a concern.
John Besser1 talked about delay in identifying foodborne illness outbreaks and Fig-
ure 3 provides a simple way of illustrating part of that problem. First, the food has to be 
consumed, and then onset of illness presentation is delayed, during which there is no 
opportunity for public-health recognition. Therefore, foodborne-illness outbreaks usually 
occur after the peak of consumption, which is a problem for investigating the source. 
And while that is bad for normal foodborne illness, for intentional contamination with 
highly pathogenic agents, it can be catastrophic.
Figure . Emerging intentional threats.
Epidemiology of an Outbreak
Figure 4 illustrates that delay with the epidemiological curve of the 006 disease outbreak 
in the United States caused by E. coli O5:H, associated with spinach. The initial 
contamination occurred on August 6, and the first case was reported on August 0. On 
September 8 the first clusters were detected through PulseNet in Oregon and western 
Wisconsin. And then, on September 4, the FDA made what was considered a rapid 
announcement of a recall of a product based solely on public-health information. The 
problem is that the circle (Figure 4) indicates when the product’s shelf life had expired. 
Therefore, the product had expired 0 days before the announcement was made; the 
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Figure 3. Food-event identification timing considerations.
Figure 4. Spinach E. coli O5:H contamination challenges
of rapid event detection.
product was gone by the time the recall was announced, and for episodic contamination 
events, this tends to be the case. Recalls are announced when there is actually very little 
left to be recalled. In systemic contamination events, like that of the Peanut Corporation 
of America (PCA), we have a greater opportunity to do a recall for effectiveness because 
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Figure 5. Wide variation in state outbreak performance:
Foodborne illness outbreaks per ,000,000 population 8–00.
(source: Center for Science in the Public Interest)
2By John Besser, page 8.
low-level contamination is on-going. Unfortunately for food defense, foodborne illness 
is more likely to be episodic and developing methods for earlier detection is important. 
That is, as was pointed out2, a function of the variability and effectiveness of the public-
health system by state.
The Center for Science in the Public Interest went through data from the Centers for 
Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) from 8 to 00 and categorized the numbers 
of foodborne-illness outbreaks reported by state per million in population (Figure 5). This 
study revealed wide variation in the effectiveness of state public-health systems. From 
an intentional contamination standpoint, these data raise a concern; a terrorist is more 
likely to strike in the southern states. Trying to improve our public-health capabilities at 
the state level, including addressing the inherent technology bias, is an important part of 
our food-defense preparedness.
Traceability
Traceability is affected by the complexity of our food system. Figure 6 provides a simpli-
fied characterization of the supply chain for a cheeseburger and, at the bottom of the 
figure, the major points of distribution from primary production through processing to 
consumers. If a terrorist announced that he had contaminated the supply chain at three 
points and nothing else, roughly 48,000 permutations and combinations of threat scenarios 
would have to be worked through to determine the contamination profile. A daunting 
task. Figure  shows the ingredients of a Big Mac, taken from the McDonald’s nutrition 
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Figure . Global supply-chain complexity, cheeseburger–.
Figure 6. Global supply-chain complexity, cheeseburger–.
website. Now, if a terrorist announced the same thing—supply-chain contamination at 
three points—the potential contamination scenarios would be increased from 48,000 to 
.5 million. Furthermore, each ingredient has its own supply chain, therefore achieving 
traceability for all ingredients in all products is still not achievable, although it’s something 
the industry is working toward.
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Sometimes these supply chains fall back upon themselves, which was a complicating factor 
in the 00 PCA case. Figure 8, from FDA, is a simplified characterization of the traceback 
of the PCA peanut paste, illustrating that some of the paste went from manufacturer 
to distributor back to manufacturer to distributor back to manufacturer to distributor 
before it finally entered retail trade. These multiple processing steps made it difficult for 
companies to deduce if they actually had the peanut paste in their products. The supplier 
of peanut paste to an ice-cream manufacturer may have no idea where the paste comes 
from. As an illustration of the complexity of this particular recall, from its announcement 
until the final product was recalled was 6 months; it took that long for the last company 
to figure out that it had shipped a product that contained the peanut paste. The needs for 
improved traceability to help us improve food safety and food defense are clear.
Global Economy
In Figure , countries in color are those to which the United States exported food products 
in 00. We provide foodstuffs to almost every country. Figure 0 shows countries from 
which the United States imported food. Several of these source countries don’t like us 
very much, like Iran, or don’t have strong food-safety systems, like most of central Asia. 
Figure 8. Peanut-paste supply chain.
The circled numbers represent products that were made using at least one ingredient 
originating from PCA’s peanut-processing facility in Blakely, Georgia.
(source: FDA)
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Figure . 00 US food-export destinations. (source: USDA-ERS)
Figure 0. 00 US food-import sources. (source: USDA-ERS)
Some aren’t logical sources of food products such as sugar from Zimbabwe, which has a 
dysfunctional food-system infrastructure; that we import any food from there is surpris-
ing, and whether it is safe is highly doubtful.
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Figure . The US food system is increasingly global.
Clearly, the food system is globally interconnected, and, to illustrate further its complex-
ity, the numbers in Figure —from the FDA’s bioterrorism registration database—show 
suppliers of food to the United States that are either in the United States or at foreign 
locations. More foreign processing sites are registered overseas to provide food to the 
United States than are registered in the United States. More foreign packers and repackers 
are registered to provide food to the United States than are registered in the United States. 
We are heavily dependent on the global system. Internationally, we have no idea how 
many farms supply the United States. On a recent visit to China, I asked representatives 
of several agencies how many farms are in the country and the estimates ranged from 0 
million to 00 million. With an error bar so large, it is impossible to estimate the risk 
profile, and characterizing and understanding our supply chains is an important aspect 
both in food safety and food defense. We refer to this as “supply chain visibility.”
Returning to the cheeseburger, Figure  shows source countries for some ingredi-
ents—vinegar, garlic powder, tomatoes, beef and wheat gluten—some of which, again, 
don’t make sense. On the other hand, the fact that we import beef from Australia is a 
good thing as their food-safety system is probably better than ours. The fact that we 
import wheat gluten from Kazakhstan may be not such a good thing. Understanding 
where ingredients come from and what risk they pose is a challenge for industry and for 
the government.
As a developing country progresses from commodity production to value-added produc-
tion, it becomes a different type of contributor to our supply chain, which may introduce 
new risks. The United States funds such development because it helps promote local 
economies. For example, the United States has helped develop the pomegranate business 

in Afghanistan, partly because Afghanistan produces perhaps the tastiest pomegranates 
in the world. However, “product of Afghanistan” on the label probably is not a selling 
point for many US consumers.
It is important to understand that the tariff system can blind us as to where imported 
foods and ingredients actually come from. Figure 3 shows the relative sizes of imports 
to the United States of cocoa and cocoa preparations, revealing that Canada is our single 
largest source of cocoa and cocoa products. Under the sugar tariff, it costs less to import 
sweetened cocoa liquor than to bring in cocoa powder and sugar separately. Realizing 
this, industry has set up supply chains that utilize Canada as a blending site. Clearly, us-
ing import data as a basis for raising concerns for food safety or food defense is entirely 
insufficient.
Economically Motivated Adulteration
Other trade data are surprising. We import wheat gluten from Singapore and shrimp from 
a landlocked country in central Asia that doesn’t like us. From the challenges of under-
standing developing agriculture and how we must ensure that those countries develop their 
food-safety and food-defense infrastructures as they expand their agriculture, we must be 
concerned also regarding economic crises and greed leading to economically motivated 
adulteration (EMA)—intentional contamination of food products to make money. The 
most recent familiar example is the contamination of proteins in dairy products in China 
with melamine—for financial gain—that resulted in 0,000 children being made ill. 
EMA is viewed as a food-defense issue not because it is an intentional threat to public 
health, but because it illustrates the ability to evade the quality-assurance systems that 
are in place, simply to make a profit. If someone with a profit motive can get around the 
quality-assurance systems he could get around them to cause harm. One of our concerns 
is that some EMA events are test runs before serious contaminants are applied.
Figure . Globalizing the cheeseburger.
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Figure 3. 00 Cocoa and cocoa-preparation imports to the United States.
(source: USDA-ERS)
It is surprising how commonly EMA occurs and in how many ways. The data in Figure 
4 are from FreightWatch, a trade group that appraises problems in the freight industry. 
In 00, electronics and food/drink, at 3% and 0%, respectively, were the largest 
causes of theft from over-the-road trucks. Several semi trailers disappear each week and 
the goods sold. How can one be sure that the robbers don’t contaminate the product 
before selling? Three years ago, a truck of contaminated ground-beef patties was stolen 
from a detainment lot before they could be disposed of. The patties were sold door to 
door in Texas and to restaurants.
Figure 5 shows products that, in recent years, have been the focus of EMA activity. 
When a company is hit by an EMA event that goes public, it results, according to the 
Grocery Manufacturers Association (GMA), in significant loss of revenue, between % and 
5% for that year. The total annual impact is estimated at $0 billion to $5 billion and, 
based on a GMA survey, up to 0% of products in retail may contain an adulterant.
Intentional Adulteration for Other Reasons
Another longstanding problem, as far as food defense is concerned, is the disgruntled 
employee, who, in frustration, does something to a product, usually to cause a loss of 
income to the company. For example, a former supermarket employee in Michigan added 
insecticide to ground beef, and, in Kansas, a woman contaminated salsa with another 
insecticide. In both cases the perpetrators—subsequently jailed—had issues with their 
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Figure 4. 00 thefts by commodity: thefts of food and drinks
are a significant problem.
(source: FreightWatch)
employers and contaminated the food as a means of getting back at them. Forty and 
seventy people, respectively, were sickened, but if these crimes had been committed in 
large production facilities, the results would have been much worse.
Then there are challenges from criminals and deviants. For example, in the United 
Kingdom a man claimed to have contaminated baby food—with ricin—at nine branches 
of Morrisons Supermarkets. Because of the difficulty of proving a negative, the company 
had to remove all baby food from its stores in order to demonstrate safety. A hoax alone 
can cause significant problems for a food company. In Italy in 008, someone injected a 
soapy solution into plastic bottles of water, the discovery of which caused mass economic 
harm to the bottled-water industry. Of greater concern was that the Italian police believe 
that it was a practice run to determine how many bottles could be contaminated before 
discovery, to see if it would be worthwhile as a terrorist target.
Intentional contamination by disgruntled employees and the like is not uncommon. 
From a study by Greg Dalziel, Figure 6 shows agents that have been used to contaminate 
food and the countries in which those contaminations occurred. These were contamina-
tion events designed to cause mass casualties, meaning three or more people. The list 
becomes lengthy with inclusion of the most common form of intentional contamination 
of food: spouse on spouse.
Then we get to extremist special-interest groups and threats they posed—such as the 
Rainforest Agribusiness Campaign, the Animal Liberation Front and the Earth Liberation 
Front that have issues with agribusiness in general and animal agriculture in particular. 
For example, the mission of the Animal Liberation Front mission is “to inflict economic 
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Figure 5. Recently documented economic adulteration events.
damage on those who profit from the misery and exploitation of animals.” Cases have 
been documented in which they have considered causing human-health harm as a way 
of eliminating agribusiness.
Figure 6. Contamination events since 8.
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Terrorism
Perhaps our greatest concern is the possibility of catastrophic events caused by terrorists. 
As an example that this is something that people are considering, in 006 there was an 
intentional contamination in Iraq of food served in a mess hall, run by Australia, that 
supplied the police force. The motivation was Shiite/Sunni sectarianism and resulted in 
at least 350 policeman suffering severe food poisoning, with many air-lifted out. In this 
low-tech event, the perpetrators simply let a couple of chickens ferment for a few days at 
ambient temperature before introducing them into the lunch-preparation process.
Such intentional contamination is not new. The first documented case occurred in 50 
BC, when the Athenians poisoned the water and food supplies for Kirrha so that they could 
overrun that city. And during World War II, the Japanese experimented with a number 
of food vehicles as means of delivering pathogens in China and Manchuria, presumably 
as test runs for similar attacks on the United States. This included airdropping candies 
containing Yersinia pestis over a village to determine if infecting children would be more 
effective than infecting adults. In 6, a laboratory technician at a hospital in Dallas, 
Texas, contaminated pastries in the break-room with Shigella dysentariae, poisoning twelve 
coworkers. As early as 00, the Central Intelligence Agency identified contamination 
of food and water supplies with chemicals and the like as being of significant interest to 
terrorist groups. After the invasion of Afghanistan, documents found at Tarnak Farms 
training grounds showed how to prepare botulinum neurotoxin, how much would have to 
be introduced into the food supply to cause harm and the relative infective rates of other 
pathogens by oral ingestion. Al-Qaeda had been working on intentional contamination 
of food systems well before September , 00.
Although there hasn’t been a large-scale attack in the United States, effort in food-system 
defense is justified partly because of public opinion. Figure  shows that consumers would 
invest more in protecting the food system from intentional contamination than from 
any other type of homeland-security threat. The fact that consumers are most interested 
in protecting the food system makes sense because they can’t take themselves out of the 
Figure . Public would spend more for food defense than for other threats.
(source: Jean Kinsey)
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target population. In their lives, they don’t have to go to major-metro areas, they don’t 
have to get on airplanes, they don’t have to use trains, but they have to eat. Therefore, 
they want to be sure that the food system is protected. For the same reason, food-safety 
events have a high profile in the United States and other developing countries. People 
want to feel safe.
Risk Analysis
There are important conceptual differences between food safety and food security especially 
in terms of evaluating potential risks and vulnerabilities. Food-safety risks, as defined by 
the Food Safety Modernization Act, are reasonably foreseeable—events that are likely 
to occur and, therefore, have a probability function. Accordingly, it is possible to build 
economic models for investment of funds to address it. In contrast, food-defense risk is 
a deterministic problem that requires an intelligent adversary and not probable system 
failure; probability is driven by threat, which requires intelligence information. And given 
that we generally have little intelligence information on what adversaries are doing until 
they’ve already done it, determining probability for food defense is challenging. From an 
industry standpoint, companies that we have been working with approach this problem 
by looking at the difference in what the consequences are. They look at things as whether 
they are an operational risk vs. an enterprise risk:
• If it will be a write-off if it occurs, they will accept that risk and won’t mitigate.
• If it will result in the potential for the firm ceasing to exist, they will invest to 
mitigate that risk.
The Society for Risk Analysis defines risk assessment as an analytical process to provide 
information regarding undesirable events. It’s the process of quantification of the prob-
abilities and expected consequences for identified risk; it’s the probability of something 
occurring. Vulnerability assessment attempts to understand the effectiveness of the defense 
system. Therefore, the concept for food safety is risk assessment. For food defense it is 
generally vulnerability assessment. Now the Department of Homeland Security makes 
it a little more complicated for us because they define risk as including vulnerability; this 
is from Secretary Michael Chertoff  1:
Our risk analysis is based on these three variables: threat, vulnerability, and 
consequences. These variables are not equal. For example, some infrastructure 
is quite vulnerable, but the consequences of an attack are relatively small; other 
infrastructure may be much less vulnerable, but the consequences of a successful 
attack are very high, even catastrophic.
The important point here is understanding vulnerability. Chertoff pointed out that 
although some things are very vulnerable, the consequences of an attack would not be 
significant. There are other things that are relatively invulnerable, but the consequences of 
an attack would be high or catastrophic. With respect to intentional contamination, the 
government is more concerned over events that would be catastrophic rather than situa-
tions that are most vulnerable. Consideration of the aggressor is necessary because, without 
understanding the aggressor, the potential consequences cannot be understood.
1See page 06.
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Figure 8 provides a limited list of aggressor types, from the disgruntled insider to the 
compromised insider to the inserted insider, covert intrusion or perhaps one’s own supplier. 
When food-defense work started in 00, in most cases the focus was on covert intrusion; 
a lot of money was spent on guns, gates and guards. We were more worried about the 
compromised insider or the inserted insider—because they would have legitimate access 
to the facility and would know where to act—or the supplier because unless supply-chain 
verification is possible you don’t know whether your supplier is a potential source of risk. 
Important also are potential aggressor objectives, ranging from system disruption to 
wholesale public confidence crisis that would result in a change in government:
• System disruption
• Brand damage
• Category damage
• Trade disruption
• Foreign affairs crisis
• Mass morbidity
• Mass mortality
• Wholesale public confidence crisis
Changes in government have occurred because of food-system failures. Look at the United 
Kingdom, the Netherlands and Taiwan. If we had a catastrophic food attack in the United 
States, we would likely have a change in government.
Detection
One of the technology needs for food defense and food safety is detection. But in detection 
we need to think about the approach. Are you detecting to prevent in order to control 
things at a site level so it never gets beyond the point where it is contaminated? Are you 
detecting to protect?; you may not detect it before it leaves the facility but you will detect 
Figure 8. Consider the aggressor.
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it before it reaches the consumer. Or are you detecting to recover, also known as detect 
to regret; it’s already out there and you are trying to find out how much is still out there. 
Detection raises challenges of what to test for and how. With respect to food defense, 
it becomes more challenging because, unlike the six most common organisms that are 
the focus of PulseNet, we have microorganisms that are normally associated with food 
and also those that are not normally associated with food as well as literally thousands of 
chemicals and toxins that are not associated with food at all, but are potential threats for 
intentional inclusion. And, unfortunately, for many of those micro-organisms, we don’t 
understand their viability, toxicity or infectivity within the food system.
Reconsidering our public-health system and its capabilities, we have the challenge of 
an intentional food-system event being responded to even more slowly. Figure  shows 
data generated four years ago, when Sara Cox gave internal medicine program directors 
presentations for certain illnesses and asked them to make diagnoses. So, 0% of the 
time they got anthrax right on the first occasion. But they got plague right initially only 
6% of the time. This goes back to the public-health problem of being trained to look 
for horses, not zebras; you are looking to diagnose something you are used to seeing, not 
something you are not used to seeing. If it is something you are not used to seeing, you 
are not likely to get it right the first time. We have a challenge on how rapidly we can 
identify these organisms with respect to how very rapidly our supply chains function 
(Figure 0). For example, bottled water, which has a potential shelf-life of several years, is 
likely to have an actual shelf life of only about 0 days. That’s how fast it moves through 
the supply chain. If we don’t improve our ability to detect contamination, any attack is 
likely to be of significant consequence. 
Primary suppliers to quick-serve restaurants produce between 500,000 and a million 
pounds of hamburger patties a day. Once they clear quality assurance, they are shipped 
within  hours and after they get to the restaurant they are generally consumed within 
48 hours. That’s the speed at which the cold supply chain functions because of the cost 
of refrigeration. Carbon dioxide is a processing aid that speeds grinding and keeps the 
ground beef at about –°C during grinding for good mouth-feel. An average of 66,000 
pounds of CO are used per 00,000 pounds of daily production. The CO could be 
effectively used as a carrier to get a large quantity of contaminants into the ground beef. 
Depending on assumptions, perhaps 3.6 million people could be affected in less than  
days by contamination of one CO shipment.
In Summary
We need better capability for systems-based risk and vulnerability assessment. We need 
better tools for supply-chain visibility and traceability. We need improved ability to check 
threat agents, the ability to identify events as they occur and the ability to inactivate the 
agents and safely dispose of the product after the event.
At the National Center for Food Protection and Defense, our vision is defending the 
safety of the food system through research and education. Our mission is to reduce the 
likelihood of an attack, to improve the nation’s ability to respond effectively and to reduce 
the consequences of an attack. Our goal, in brief, is to render targets unattractive.
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Figure . Physicians’ ability to diagnose select agents.
Figure 0. Product speed to consumer: risks of supply-chain efficiency.
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